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Introduction: #Halech vs. #Daesh in Syria
1 The social network Twitter in 2014, received a new hashtag in Arabic, #Halech1. Acronym
for  “Hezbollah  in  Lebanon  and  the  Levant”,  this  pun draws  a  parallel  between  the
presence in Syria of Hezbollah and the “Da'esh”, the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS),
that is Al Qaeda. 
2 The authors by this analogy intend to denounce both the practices of Sunni jihadists and
those of another “face of terrorism” (Harik, 2006), that of Shiite militias (Lebanese, Iraqi
and Iranians) who came to lend a hand to the Bashar al-Assad regime. 
3 Since 2013, the systematic use of these foreign soldiers on the frontline in the battle was
accompanied by the emergence of a popular resolutely identitarian and violently anti-
Shiite discourse hitherto unprecedented in Syria. This article, from a paper presented in
English  at  the  Hebrew  University  of  Jerusalem  (HUJ)  and  in  French  at  Sciences Po
(Menton campus), analyses the representations of these paramilitary units by the Syrian
opposition2, by studying the speeches on this “new enemy” (‘udû) and on their place in
the collective imagination of Syrians fighting against the regime. This paper will rely in
that  purpose  on a  set  of  semi-structured interviews3 conducted at  the  Lebanese-and
Turkish-Syrian  borders,  and  on  the  systematic  compilation  of  materials  from  the
Tansiqiyyât4. 
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“Sûriyah Al Muhtalah”5: an overview of the Shiite
militia forces in Syria
The symbolism of the battle of Qussayr (April-June 2013)
4 On 25 May 20136, Hassan Nasrallah7 in a long speech officially recognised the involvement
of the military branch of the Lebanese Hezbollah in the Syrian conflict. For the first time
since the beginning of the revolution, a regional political actor publicly mentioned its
direct military support to the Bashar al-Assad regime. 
5 The speech of  the Shiite party leader was broadcast at  the dawn of  the battle  of  Al
Qussayr8 (May – June 2013), where thousands of militias took part in the repressions led
by the regime. Hezbollah's decisive war effort helped the Syrian government recapture
the city from the opposition fighters9 . 
6 In this case, in the last days of the battle, fighting was fully carried out and coordinated
by Hezbollah. Operating autonomously, the Shiite party gradually replaced the Syrian
army:
Hezbollah's entry into Qussayr was progressive, and not sudden. In the last month,
85% of the fighters were from Hezbollah, and 15% from the Syrian army. Then, in
the last ten days of the battle, 100% of the fighters were from Hezbollah, we did not
see a single Syrian soldier10.
7 Within a few weeks, 3,000 Hezbollah men were deployed to address the difficulties of the
regime by holding ground against the Syrian insurgents and containing the daily flood of
defections within the Army. 
8 Hence, faced with a considerable operational requirement and the need to win a major
and symbolic victory, the Syrian regime11 decided to solicit the help of the Shiite party.
Massively deployed to Qussayr,  the Hezbollah fighters  were thus able  to  reverse the
balance of power, initially in favour of the Syrian opposition, before expelling them as
well as hundreds of residents of the small town now occupied. 
9 As such, the capture of Qussayr marked a real turning point in the Syrian conflict,  as
mentioned by the FSA spokesman: 
What  is  unacceptable  is  the  interference  [tadâkhul]  of  Hezbollah,  which  is  now
controlling  [sayṭarah]  Qussayr.  [...]  Hezbollah  soldiers  were  the  ones  searching
houses, handling the artillery, heavy weapons and even the tanks. [...] And in the
end, the villagers were expelled by Shiite militias; that's why they hate Hezbollah.
They did not only help in the fighting, they expelled the inhabitants of the town.
10 Thus, the loss of the town was doubly symbolic: firstly, the blitzkrieg of Hezbollah and the
successive  bombings  helped  the  regime  to  recapture  the  whole  territory  from  the
opposition fighters. Held since the spring of 2012, the stronghold of Qussayr fell in barely
three weeks, becoming one of the first major defeats of the opposition. However, this
would not  have happened without  the decisive  intervention fighters  from the Shiite
party.
11 Then, for the first time since the beginning of the revolution, civilians saw their city
occupied by foreign militias, thereby reinforcing the sense of “injustice” (ẓulm) of the
conflict. The latter was obviously spread through social networks and the flood of videos
showing the exile of the inhabitants of Qussayr or glorifying the action of the Shiite party.
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For example, in this excerpt12 several militias, singing a military song wave a black flag in
the colours of Imam Hussein13, then hang it at the top of a mosque of the town, marking
their victory in the city and sacred places. 
12 Hence, what is emphasized here is the occupation of this town by a foreign group, the
Hezbollah and not the loss of Qussayr. 
 
The “occupation forces”: an indicative prosopography of foreign
combat troops in Syria
13 Mapping  out  precisely  the  additional  non-native  units  of  the  regime  is  a  complex
exercise.  As an introductory remark,  it  should be recalled that since the battle of  Al
Qussayr (spring of 2013), the “Assadist Army” (Al Jaysh Al âssâdî) seemed to rely on the
systematic  use  of  military  and paramilitary forces  or  foreign militia  to  suppress  the
revolution. 
14 However, these fighters looked increasingly less like auxiliaries, but more like real proxy
micro-armies. In fact, the decision to export these troops primarily responded to the need
to address the strategic and tactical shortcomings of the Syrian armed forces, which were
poorly trained, poorly equipped, and seemed to have completely fallen apart over the
past three years. With the exception of the notorious 4th Brigade of the Republican Guard
(RG), which remained loyal to the regime and remained operational, the rest of the army
was plagued with defections (up to 80% in some units),  killed and wounded soldiers.
Furthermore, the armed forces were characterized by a chronic lack of experience and an
almost  non-existent  operational  maintenance:  since  1982  (during  the  Lebanon  war),
Syrian soldiers had not fired a single shot. 
15 Therefore, the massive importation of foreign militias was adopted to respond to the
disintegration of the Syrian army, with each of the concerned forces having their own
motivations:
16 - The Lebanese Hezbollah: about 2,000 militias were currently in Syria (with peaks at 3,000
or possibly 4,000 depending on the operational imperatives), implementing a counter-
insurgency  know-how patiently  acquired  during  the  past  decades,  especially  against
Israel. Hezbollah was at the forefront of the battle, sometimes taking the place of the
Syrian army vertically and horizontally, as was the case in Qussayr and now Aleppo. 
Officially, the party provided material and logistic support to Lebanese at the borders,
helped Syrian refugees,  guarded sacred sites  (the Sayyida Zaynab mausoleum,  in the
Damascus  rîf,  especially)  and  protected  the  religious  minorities  they  considered  as
threatened14.  However, the massive involvement of the Shiite party clearly seemed to
meet the need to preserve the Bashar al-Assad regime, a historical ally. 
17 - The Guardians of the Iranian revolution: concerning the Pasdarans, the equipment available
for then was extremely limited. So far, only the British channel BBC succeeded, in the
summer of 2013, to obtain a video showing a group of fighters of the Al Quds15 force in the
field16.  Contrasting with the image of a massively deployed Hezbollah,  it  shows some
atomized elements of the Iranian Special Forces, moving from town to town, following
orders and offering training or advice to regime forces (elite corps of the Syrian Army,
hezbollahis militias or Yemenis). Occasionally these wandering Iranian servicemen fought
against the opposition.
In all,  several  hundreds of  Iranian military advisers were reportedly deployed to the
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Syrian territory, near sensitive strategic sites and also in Shiite-concentrated localities
(for example, Latakia).
18 - Iraqi forces: Iraq was represented by the Abu Al Fadl Al Abbas brigades and the Mahdi
Army. It is very difficult to precisely quantify their militia strength, but it seems that
several  thousands  of  fighters  crossed  the  Iraqi-Syrian  border  in  recent  months.  The
brigades  (Katâ’îb)  defended  the  holy  shrines  of  Shiite  Islam,  especially  the  Sayyidah
Zaynab mausoleum (alongside Hezbollah), the Umayyads and Aleppo mosques, the Krak
des  Chevaliers and  the  city  of  Bosra  Sham,  stronghold  of  a  medium-sized  Shiite
community. 
19 In all, between 8,000 and 10,000 foreign fighters fought in Syria on behalf of the regime.
Mainly Iraqi and Lebanese, these privates, trained and heavily equipped rotated in and
out (back-to-back), bringing the operational reserve to 30,000, or about twice more than
the  foreign  fighters  (jihadists)  of  the  opposition17.  Moreover,  the  presence  of  some
Yemeni (houthis), Afghan and Pakistani soldiers can also be emphasized.
 
“The name of Satan”: the Shiite threat through the
prism of the Syrian narrative
The “Rafidi party”: a look at Hezbollah representations by the Syrian
communities in exile
20 You  must  first  name  your  enemy  (‘udû)  before  representing  him.  Among  the  many
nicknames attributed to Hezbollah by opposition fighters, the “Party of God” (Hizb ‘Âllah)
became for example the “The Party of Satan” (Hizb Al Shaytan). This 180 degrees semantic
shift follows a plural sense: firstly, it allowed the revolutionaries to personify the ills they
faced. In their eyes, Shaytan embodied absolute evil, which should be fought against for
religious and even humanitarian imperatives: 
Hezbollah is the enemy. They participate in the fightings, they help the regime [Niẓ
âm], and they kill, as Bashar, is actually doing. They are called the Party of God. But
who are they to call themselves thus? They are nobodies; they are the enemy, the
enemy indeed, that's why they are called the Party of Satan.
21 The party of “God” has become that of “Satan” in order to delegitimize its name. This is
what Youssef Al Qaradawi explains in a video posted in May 2013 on the social network
Youtube. For the Sunni preacher, Hezbollah has no right to be called “God” because in
killing Muslims, they are in fact drifting away from God18. It can legitimately be described
as the alter ego of God, Al Shaytan. The party leader is also not spared by this term because
Nasrallah (literally, the “victory of God”) is transformed to Nasr Al Shaytan (and therefore,
the “victory of Satan”). 
22 In Qaradawi's speech, the reference to Satan is in no way surprising and is in line with
certain continuity. In fact, since the beginning of the war in Iraq, there was a tendency
amongst  the  Salafi-Jihadis  movements  to  lash  out  against  Hezbollah  and,  in  general,
against the Twelver Shiiism (Paz, 2004). Hassan Nasrallah has moreover, for several years
now, been one of the priority targets of jihadist forums, probably due to his growing
popularity amongst the Sunni population, especially since the “victory” of 200619.  The
Hezbollah leader is in turn called “traitor” (khâ’in) or “Jew” (yahûd), depending on the
degree  of  antipathy  expressed.  Therefore,  qualifying  Hezbollah  as  “Shaytan”  is  not
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original  and is  still  rooted in  the  readings  and discursive  practices  of  jihadists.  The
novelty of the Syrian conflict resides in the fact that, henceforth, this criticism with very
strong religious undertones is shared by a majority of people who do not have any links
with the Salafi movement. 
23 For example, an insurgent confessed to the author that it was mere a play on words, a
linguistic transformation that was “logically imposed” in response to the participation of
party  activists  in  the  atrocities  committed  by  the  regime.  According  to  him,  these
atrocities can be termed as “eerie”. As such, the Shiite party or the Syrian military were
no  longer  simple  fighters  but  structures  “personifying  evil  and  dedicated  to  evil”
(Messadié, 1994). In the face of a spiral of barbarism, Syrians were then seeking for a
religious explanation, transforming the revolution into a struggle between Good (khayr)
and Evil (shir). 
 
“The camp of freedom and the camp of death”: dissemination and
politicization of popular anti-Shiite rhetoric
24 Since  2013,  Syrian  popular  discourse  on  Hezbollah  has  gradually  shifted  to  the
articulation of essentialist violent indictments against the Twelver and Alawite Shiisms,
generally supported by elements of a shared history.
25 For example, refugees are a constant reminder of the memory of 2006. During the “33
days”20 war, several tens of thousands of Lebanese were “welcomed” in Syria, most of the
time in private homes. Moreover, the Syrian Government provided supplies and logistics
to the military wing of Hezbollah; without the unwavering support of Damascus, it is
likely that the outcome of the war would not have been the same. And yet, Hezbollah's
entry  into  the  war  in  Syria  led  many  Syrians  to  lump  together  the  Shiite  political
movement and its supporters, thereby recalling the events of 2006: 
In 2006, the Shiites came to our country. We welcomed them; my aunt housed an
entire family all through the war. They got along well, there were no problems. And
now, this is how they thank us: by killing us?
26 In Shaheen’s approach, the Lebanese Shiites accommodated by his aunt were invariably
the same people, currently supporting Hezbollah's military action in Syria or directly
involved in it  whereas  they should be grateful  for  the kindness  received during the
summer of 2006. Here, it is not a matter of denouncing the participation of the Shiite
party in the fightings with the FSA or Islamist militias, but how Syrian refugees were
received across the border and comparing with the summer of 2006. 
27 In addition, videos of inhumane and degrading acts were regularly seen and heard by
Syrians, fuelling the idea of a natural “cruelty” of the Lebanese Shiites vis-à-vis refugees
settled in the southern suburbs of Beirut. For example, the video of a forced tattooing of a
young  Syrian  by  qabadayat21 of  the  Dahiyeh 22 really  created  a  lasting  impression  on
people's minds23. Similarly, refugees were often attacked by the Lebanese, heightening
the feeling of insecurity at the border and the perception of a Lebanese hostility vis-à-vis
Syrian presence. 
28 The speeches of political or military elites of the so-called 'moderate' opposition were
fuelled by some form of ambiguity on Hezbollah. Live on Al Jazirah, the colonel-doctor
Abdel Hamid Zakarayah, then spokesman of the chief of staff of the FSA, was asked to
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react to an opinion poll revealing that for 72.9% of persons interviewed24, “Hezbollah had
become an enemy in the eyes of the majority of Arabs and Muslims”25:
The party of Satan is lost. First and foremost, I do not want anyone to understand
my words as a sectarian or ideological war. My words here are only intended to
rally [yuhashidu] people against the killings [qatala], they are directed to the Sunnis,
the Shiites or the Alawis. Iran and Hezbollah do not represent the Shiites, but they
represent the killings. […] We do not know anything about faiths in Syria. There are
only two camps in Syria: those who want freedom and dignity, and those in the
death camp26.
29 Apparently,  colonel  Zakaryah  seems  to  ward  off  the  temptation  of  falling  into  the
sectarian trap set by the regime. In downplaying the “ideological” stake of the clashes
and denying to lump together Hezbollah, Iran and Shiism, this FSA spokesman seemed to
be looking for ways to debunk the popular myth of a “Shiite” oppression. However, his
introductory remarks actually refer to the djinn (Hizb Al Shaytan). Although apparently
rhetorical,  this  reasoning however has  strong religious undertone on the opposition,
widely  conveyed  by  the  popular  imagination,  between  “Good”  and  “Evil”.  Broadly
speaking,  it  plays  on  the  widespread  representation  of  a  sectarian  conflict  between
Sunnis and Shiites.
30 Finally, the distinction between the camps of freedom and death is presented as a policy,
opposing  two  categories  of  actors.  In  reality,  it  is  highly  symbolic  but  particularly
ambiguous. By borrowing from the sectarian (Tâ’ifi) vocabulary, the spokesman makes
allusion here to something very serious, implicitly echoing the religious affiliation of the
actors accused.
 
Beyond the Lebanese Hezbollah: the denunciation of a transnational
Shiite “conspiracy”
31 In the rhetoric of the Syrian opposition, the deployment of foreign Shiite fighters also
fuelled the theory of a “conspiracy” (mu’âmarah), with the aim of controlling Syria and
depriving it of its religious identity. Faced with the sectarian homogeneity of their new
occupants, Syrians thus evoked the “Shiite Crescent” as a theoretical framework of the
conflict. According to Ibrahim:
The conflict in Syria is a revolution that is linked to a Shiite conspiracy. Look at
what is happening: Syria is no longer only for Syrians, it hosts all the armies of the
region. You have the Lebanese of Hezbollah, Iranians, and Iraqi militias. And all are
Shiites. They do not want to lose Syria, and for them this is important. Behind it, is
a large Persian project designed by [Nouri Al] Maliki, Ayatollah [Khameinei], and
Nasrallah, who is the worst of all.
32 The “Persian Project” (al-mashrû˓  al-fârsî)27 refers to, as Legrain (2009) mentions, “the
dynasty at the beginning of 16th century, forcefully imposed by the Twelver Shiism in Iran
hitherto Sunni”28. By mentioning this project, Ibrahim’s imagination implicitly denounces
a project to convert (tadâkhul) Syria to Shiism. 
33 However, if the religious aspect does offer a secondary frame of reference, his remarks
should primarily be analysed in his political representation. Moments after this assertion
on the “Persian project”, one of the Ibrahim's friends noted that “Hezbollah, Iran and
Russia” were taking control (akhada al saytarah) of the Syrian State apparatus:
It is known [maarouf] that the Syrian army no longer controls anything. May be
even  [Bashar  al-]  Assad  himself  no  longer  gives  orders  to  anyone.  Everywhere,
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Iranians, Russians and Hezbollahis have taken over control of the administration.
Each Alawite political leader has an adviser who tells him what to do exactly. As for
the Army, it  no longer does anything,  it  obeys the orders of  Hezbollah and the
Revolutionary Guards, but that's all. Syria has been completely bled dry.
34 Therefore, the Syrian Army “is no longer controlling anything” while the country is being
“bled dry” to satisfy an Iranian plot to eventually take over the entire Syrian political
apparatus. 
35 Here, the conspiracy theory provides a rational framework to a situation perceived as
“unimaginable” (mish maaqûl), that of a drained Syria, torn by horror and barbarism29,
from all angles. Hundreds of thousands of deaths thus sanctioned a predefined project,
that of an Iran seeking to expand the territorial scope of its empire. The Syrian civil war
was ultimately not the result of a horrible uncontrollable vicious circle,  but a strong
desire to serve the interests of global Shiism by establishing a geographical and sectarian
connection between Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran. In the background appears the theory
of the Shiite “crescent”, this “collective anxiety” (Thual, 2004) adopted as regional frame
of reference by many Sunni political actors.
36 Beyond the conspiracy fantasies,  Syrian fears were eminently political.  During a joint
interview conducted in Lebanon, one of the respondents (Lebanese Sunni) did not fail to
remind – in a humorous but somewhat serious tone – his Syrian comrade that, “like them,
they  would  sooner  or  later  face  the  Shiitisation  [tashayyu’]”  of  Syria30,  before  being
refuted by his spokesperson. Indeed, unlike in neighbouring Lebanon where the Shiism
can  be  seen  by  other  faiths  as  expansionist,  Syrians  interviewed  do  not  fear  to  be
overwhelmed demographically, given that they are acutely aware of their overwhelming
numerical  superiority.  Rather,  they  especially  fear  that  a  foreign  power  (Lebanese,
Iranian or Russian) can swallow up the Syrian political apparatus. 
37 Finally, this perception is in line with a prospective logic, that of a post-Bashar era. “If”31
the power in place were able to win the battle in the field, it would be for the Syrian
people some sort  of  double punishment:  that  of  a  resilient  Ba'thist  regime,  but  now
drained of its decision-making power and controlled by the “the Persians” (farsîyyin).
 
“The intimate enemy”, a discourse on the revolutionary
alter eg
‘Tashbih': the revolution against “traitors” and war profiteers
38 In the speech of the Syrian opposition, violent denunciation of the “conspiracy” was not
only directed abroad, to a fortiori Shiite, but also to the intimate enemy (al-‘udû al-hamîm),
that is, one who claims to defend the same cause but the means or purpose differ. For
example,  this  is  particularly true of  the term “tashbih” that  is  “shabihisation” or,  if
literally translated, “becoming a ghost”.
39 The word here refers to Chabihas, notorious since the beginning of the revolution. Strong
men injected with testosterone and anabolic agents32, the Chabihas are the henchmen of
the “mafia” regime of Bashar al-Assad, according to Filiu's analogy (2012). Qabadayat of
modern  times,  their  loyalty  to  the  Assad  family  cannot  be  doubted.  As  such,  as
perpetrators of civil rights abuses, they are very much hated by the Syrian people:
They have been around for decades. They began their massacres under Hafez, and
continued  with  Bashar.  They  were  there  at  the  beginning  of  the  revolution;  in
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Damascus, their job was to deter crowds from coming together by beating them up.
They are still there now; they are being referred to, all the time, everywhere. They
rape, kill and massacre. They are worse than the [foreign] militias, who answer for
their actions [to their hierarchy], worse than the popular committees which are
just lost children, worse than everybody because they are answerable to nobody,
absolutely nobody. 
So, they kill, rape, beat children on behalf of Bashar al-Assad.
40 In the Syrian national imagination, the Chabiha is still the most abject incarnation of the
regime.  The  symbolic  connotation  of  the  term  “tashbih”,  derived  from  'shabiha',  is
particularly  strong.  In  this  case,  for many spokespersons,  the  term does  not  denote
supporters of Bashar al-Assad but actors from the ranks of the opposition. The “Tashbih”
is then the war profiteer or, more generally, the individual using the revolution for their
personal interests, be they political or economic. 
41 This is for example the case of Colonel Ahmed Fahd Naameh, in the region of Daraa. Killed
in the fightings in November 2013, Naameh was considered by many members of the
Syrian opposition as directly responsible for the loss of the city of Khirbet Al Ghazaleh,
recaptured by the Syrian army in May 2013. In a video33 broadcast on Youtube on 7 July
2013,  several  officers of  the “southern front” of the FSA called for his trial  in court,
blaming him for all the ills “abroad”, from where he received his orders. The colonel
voluntarily cut off Khirbet Al Ghazaleh from the supply route used by the revolutionaries
and “abandoned the city, […] resulting in the death of dozens of fighters”. Although these
accusations primarily reflect interpersonal tensions, they are indicative of the discursive
process to identify, within the revolution, its enemies. 
42 Moreover, the speech of the Syrian opposition also refers to the “traitors” (khâ'in) of the
revolution.  “Khâ'in”,  whose  meaning  is  quite  similar  to  “tashbih”  when  it  comes  to
denunciation, helps understanding the violence of this latter concept: while traitor, in the
broad sense of  the word,  means soldiers who have diverted their attention from the
revolution (especially “senior officers of the Syrian army who promised to desert but
finally did not leave office [or] western countries which did not provide assistance despite
their declarations”34), the “tashbih” is rather inclusive and pinpoints Syrians who actively
participated in the revolution, but used it to serve their interests (war profiteers). This is
the case of Naameh who blocked supplies from entering the town of Khirbet Al Ghazaleh
or  self-proclaimed  revolutionary  actors,  using  their  political  or  family  legitimacy  to
divert humanitarian funds. 
43 Finally, it is interesting to note that when the danger or threat comes from the intimate,
that is to say, the opposition themselves, the term refers almost automatically to the
oppressor: the one who betrays the revolution or uses it for personal gains becomes a
Shabiha and symbolically joins the ranks of the regime. By hijacking the revolution, they
transform themselves into the 'ghosts' of the revolution. 
 
“The fighters of the regime”: between Abû Al Qa‘qa‘ and Al Qaeda,
the bugbear of the foreign Jihadists
44 From  2012,  the  Syrian  opposition,  under-equipped  and  facing  considerable  financial
difficulties, helped jihadist groups affiliated to Al Qaeda to rise to power. In a few months,
several thousands35 of takfiri foreign fighters crossed the borders of Bilâd Ash Shâm36 to
wage the Jihad alongside groups like the Al Nosrah Front or the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham
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(ISIS), both directly or indirectly linked to Al Qaeda. These fundamentalist groups rapidly
occupied a major place in the representations of the Syrian opposition. 
45 For Adel, 28 years old:
The Nosrah or Al Qaeda are not Syrian fighters, they are foreigners [ghurabâ’]. Most
of them were released from prison at the beginning of the crisis, and they were
veterans of the jihad in Iraq. They were controlled by the Syrian secret services. In
any case, all the Dawlah [Al Qaeda] guys you can see, are linked to the regime. As you
can clearly see, they pursue the same interests, explode bombs in places where the
regime  has  sovereignty  [saytarah],  and  kill  Christians  to  destroy  Syria,  as  in
Jaramana and Maaloula! They do not fight Bashar, they help Bashar! Look at Deir Ez
Zor, they even sell him the oil they control.
46 Since the beginning of the revolution, the Syrian regime has likened civilian protests to a
project  of  Islamist  demolition  of  the  society.  The  March  2011  unrests  were  thus
transformed  into  a  “conspiracy”  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood,  the  Salafists  or  the
American-Israeli-Saudi  axis  to  destabilize  the Syrian nation.  Meanwhile,  it  seems the
Syrian regime had largely contributed to this self-fulfilling prophecy by releasing dozens
of Syrian and foreign jihadists, veterans of the Iraq war, by then imprisoned in Syria.
Bernard Rougier, quoted by Romain Caillet (2013), cited the example of Abu Al Qa'qa,
jihadist trained and controlled by the Syrian secret services, murdered in 2007 in Aleppo.
Other  precedents  abound  in  this  light  and  suggest  that  in  the  first  months  of  the
revolution, the Syrian secret services encouraged the growth of the jihadist phenomenon,
before it escaped them completely.
47 Adel  further  mentions  Jaramana,  a city  in  the  Damascus  suburbs,  located  about  ten
kilometres  from  the  district  of  Umayyads.  Inhabited  by  a  majority  of  Druze  and
Christians, the small town is a strategic point as it provides access to the nearby Bab
Sharqi,  in  the  heart  of  the  historic  district  of  Damascus37.  Since  the  conflict  began,
Jaramana was firmly held by the elite forces of the regime, backed by the “volunteer”
corps of the Popular Committees38, present in their thousands. The FSA had so far, never
managed to penetrate this town despite repeated attempts. Whereas, on several occasions
in 2012 and 2013, the city was hit by violent attacks especially on 28 November 2012: on
this day, four simultaneous explosions killed dozens of people, wounding hundreds more.
Car bombs regularly explode in this neighbourhood, killing Druze or Christian people.
The analysis of these terrorist acts by Leverrier (2012) suggests that despite the regime's
accusations against the sponsors “takfiris” the “services” themselves were responsible for
these explosions39.
48 The other city mentioned is Maaloula: a Christian historical city, classified as a world
heritage site by UNESCO, home to the last speakers of the Aramaic language. Located 55
kilometres from the Syrian capital, it has since the summer of 2013 been the scene of
violent clashes between militia groups identified as belonging to Al Qaeda and the Syrian
army. The two warring parties in turn won and then lost grounds gained the previous
day. At present, 2,000 Christians have fled the city, while the church of Mar Takla has
been destroyed by the jihadists. These jihadists also took 18 nuns hostage, in December
201340 .
49 Although the situations of the two cities cannot be compared (Jaramana is in the hands of
the  regime  while  they  are  losing  ground41 in  Maaloula),  Adel  makes  a  comparison
between  two  dynamics  perceived  as  harmful  to  the  Syrian  opposition:  in  Jaramana,
attacks  explicitly  aimed  at  Christian  and  Druze  communities  contributed  to  the
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sectarianisation of the conflict, turning the town away from the revolutionary path. As
for Maaloula,  although the jihadists fought the Syrian army there,  they aimed at the
wrong target, lumping together the local population (Christians) and the regime, thus
reinforcing the siege mentality of the inhabitants of Maaloula, considered a priori to be
“favourable” to Bashar al-Assad. 
50 However, there was actually a formal collusion or a direct link between the regime and
jihadist groups hiding behind these two movements. These groups (JAN or Al Qaeda) are
indeed those who organised attacks as proxies of the government to maintain the self-
fulfilling  rhetoric  of  the  Baath  Party  that  of  an  Islamist  project  to  promote  and
sectarianize  a  civil  conflict.  Furthermore,  empirical  evidence  would  support  these
theories: how could Al Qaeda cross the blockade imposed by the popular committees in
the city of Jaramana, without the assistance of the regime? But Ibrahim puts it thus:
I'll tell you why Maaloula was attacked by the ISIS, but more importantly why the
regime was behind all this. This city is of no strategic interest, just symbolic, there
are Christians living there and it is true that they are close to the regime. Attacking
this city, is a double victory for the Assadist army: it helped fuel the idea that the
revolution is a Salafi one, in the eyes of the West [gharb], terrorising Christians who
are now afraid of Sunnis. Even if the city is captured, it does not mean anything to
the regime. They are attacking a position which in reality has no interest. I think
the ISIS is really silly; the regime is behind all this. There is no doubt [ma fî shukûk].
51 Therefore, rational military reasons would explain the links between the jihadists and the
Syrian  regime:  while  the  FSA “works”  (ishteghal)  on  strategic  objectives  expected  to
ensure the victory of the opposition on the ground in the long run, movements like the
ISIS concentrate their efforts on symbolic points,  like the Christian city of  Maaloula,
isolated  and  far  from  the  capital.  This  perception  of  'field  work'  (aamal  maydani)
supported the theory of a hidden link between the JAN, Al Qaeda and the Syrian regime.
In fact, by attacking cities like Maaloula, the jihadists somehow killed two birds with one
stone in  favour  of  Bashar  al-Assad:  on the  one hand, their  assaults  did  not  put  the
“occupation” army in any danger and, on the other hand, it would tarnish the domestic
and international image of the armed opposition, reduced by observers to the violence of
fundamentalist movements and their symbolic acts. 
52 For some, the jihadists were even the “collaborators” ('umâla') of the regime. The use of
the term “’amîl” here carries a strong symbolic connotation because it  is  an implicit
reference  to  “‘umalâ’  ‘Isrâ’îl”, collaborators  and  auxiliaries  from  Israel  during  the
occupation of Southern Lebanon42. Since then, the term has probably taken root in the
regional imagination and it is being recycled by the opposition to describe the jihadists
based in Syria and is used to measure the deep enmity of the “historic” opposition for
“foreigners” and other fighters detracting from the revolutionary message. 
53 However,  this  deep antipathy finds its  limits  in the evaluation of  the purely tactical
potential of jihadists. Adel summarises it in a few words: “they are really good”. In the
eyes of the revolutionaries,  the structural efficiency of “fundamentalists” (mutaasibîn)
could not be questioned, as Ahmed recalls: 
This is the dilemma. For me, they serve only the interests of Bashar but they are
indeed very good. They are not afraid to die, and this produces incredible scenes
where they are willing to sacrifice several fighters for an operation to succeed. And
if it fails, they start all over again. Really, they are not afraid.
54 On the purely operational aspect, all persons interviewed shared the same approach and
emphasized the “effective” nature of tafkiri jihadist movements. If the FSA regularly has a
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hard time against the regime's army or against its foreign auxiliaries43, Al Qaeda and JAN
have  left  a  lasting  impression  on  people's  minds  with  their  spectacular  operations,
particularly  given the  modus  operandi characteristic  of  jihadists,  i.e. suicide  bombings
(Lund, 2012). 
55 However,  this  efficiency naturally  induces  a  frustration of  the FSA fighters,  who see
themselves  as  “losers”  within an implicit  competition for  military  legitimacy on the
ground. Yet, the failures of the historic military opposition and the spiral of violence
contributed  in  swelling  the  ranks  of  jihadist  movements44.  Moreover,  their  modus
operandi  characterized  by  suicide  operations  (aamaliyat  intihariyah)  undermining  the
efforts of the FSA to build a “moderate” guerrilla image is strongly denounced.
56 In conclusion, it may be noted that according to a mechanism borrowing from Hezbollah
and Tashbih representation, the enemy within, even if he fights in the same direction, is
likened to the oppressor and denounced by the Syrian opposition as an element of the
conspiracy theory. Supposed emanations of the Syrian regime, Al Qaeda or the JAN were
therefore fighting directly or indirectly for Bashar al-Assad and therefore, implicitly for
Shiites and Iranian interests. 
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NOTES
1. L’ORIENT-LE JOUR, “#Halech : une campagne sur Twitter contre Daech et le Hezbollah” (#Halech: a
campaign on Twitter against Daech and Hezbollah), 20 February 2014. 
2. “Opposition” here means political or armed actors claiming to be representatives of the Syrian
National Council (SNC) or, more generally, fighters and civilians clamouring for the departure of
Bashar Al-Assad.
3. For security reasons and conciseness purposes, names and dates are not given.
4. The  Local  Coordination  Committees  (LCC),  “[leaders  of  the]  protest  on  a  local  and
decentralized basis” (Filiu, 2012), published hundreds of videos shot on Syrian territory daily, on
social networks.
5. “Occupied Syria”.
6. PRESS TV IRAN, “Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah (HA) -Speech- Saturday, May 25, 2013”, Youtube, online
at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wHHnYwr2044.
7. Hassan Nasrallah is since 1992, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah.
8. Al Qussayr, which has several thousand inhabitants, is located in the countryside (rîf) of Homs
and is a “regional continuum” (Leroy, 2013) with the Lebanese region of Hermel. Socio-economic
and agro-pastoral hub between Syria and Lebanon, the small town connects Damascus to the
Mediterranean coast and as such is a key supply route for Hezbollah and the regime, and thus a
priority for the Syrian opposition.
9. The town was then held by the FSA (Free Syrian army) as well as elements of the Jubhat Al Nuṣ
rah (hereinafter, the JAN) and other Islamist groups.
10. AL JAZEERA, “Liqâ’ Al Yûm – Hâdî Al ˓Abd Âllah... Ma˓arakat Quṣaîrˮ, Youtube, 6 juillet 2013, en
ligne sur https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kTIBH2nTlos.
11. That is to say, probably, Moscow, Tehran and Hezbollah’s leadership.
12. Ahmed  Mohamid,  “Fîdîyû  khaṭîr  min  khilâlihi  Ḥizb  ‘âllah  ya˓lanu  ‘ân  Madînatu  Quṣayr
Madînat Shi˓iahˮ, Youtube, 9 June 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ATVb_sfAdg
13. Imam Hussein was the grandson of Muhammad. Third imam of the Shiite dynasty (after Ali
and Hassan), he was killed in Karbala on 10 October 680 by Ibn Ziyâd troops. Each year, during
the Ashura ceremony, Shiites commemorate his martyrdom.
14. See http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/hezbollah%E2%80%99s-role-syria.
15. The “Al Quds” force is the “service action” (Rodier, 2013) of the guardians of the Revolution.
16. AKHBÂR  AL  ‘ÂN,  “Ṣûr  ḥasala  ˓alîhâ  ‘âl  ‘ân  min  Liwâ’ Dawûd  taẓhuru  ḍubâṭân  ‘îrâniyyîn
yudaîrûna ˓amaliyât bi-‘Îdlib”, online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AB2CXDIigRg.
17. NGC BLOG, “Shiite Foreign Fighters in Syria: Facts, Narratives and Regional Impact”, 24 January
2014.
18. Youtube, “Al-Muqṭa Al-A’nif fî khiṭbati Al-Jam’ah lilShaykh Al Qaradawi yuṣifu Ḥizb Allah bi Ḥ
izbi Al-Shaytan”, May 31, 2013, online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-npCduuHNw.
19. This popularity dwindled down consecutively at the beginning of the Syrian civil war.
20. On the 2006 war, see Franck Mermier, Elizabeth Picard, Liban, une guerre de 33 jours (Lebanon, a
33-day war), Paris, La Découverte, Cahiers libres, 2007, 264 pages.
21. The term refers to small thugs or henchmen.
22. The “Dahiyeh” (“suburb”) is an area south of Beirut, predominately inhabited by the Shia
community. 
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23. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS  GROUP, “A Precarious Balancing Act: Lebanon and the Syrian conflict”,
Middle East Report n° 132, 22 November 2012, p. 27.
24. The channel held that 627, 921 visitors responded to this poll on the Internet.
25. AL-’ÎTIJÂH  AL-MA‘ÂKIS,  “Tadkhul  Ḥizb  ‘Âllah  fî  Suriyâ”,  Youtube,  en  ligne  sur  http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=KWL87OUWRmA.
26. Ibid.
27. Several persons interviewed also mentioned the “Safavid project” (Al-Mashrû˓ al-safawî) and
called the Iranian advisers as “Persia’s” Pasdarans. 
28. Jean-François Legrain, “La menace chiite en Palestine, entre phobies et propagandes” (The
Shiite  threat  in  Palestine,  between  phobia  and  propaganda),  Ism-France.org,  http://www.ism-
france.org/analyses/La-menace-chiite-en-Palestine-entre-phobies-et-propagandes-article-12832,
12 octobre 2009.
29. The title of Michel Seurat book (1989) finds here once again its deeper meaning.
30. The remark refers to the accusations of Shia “evangelisation” (tabshîr) of Lebanon against
Hezbollah. Hassan Nasrallah himself had to refute these claims several times; see this on Youtube,
“Nasrallah on Interfaith Conversions”, 28 September 2007, online at http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=BSGqkFv5JZ0.
31. “Iza !”, repeats several times the person interviewed.
32. Their pictures posted on the Internet, trigger torrents of insults and mocking remarks on
Syrian social networks.
33. ORIENT-NEWS,  “Qarâr bi‘azli  wa Maḥâkamah Al-‘Aqîd ‘Âḥmad Fahd Al-Na‘mah”, Youtube,  en
ligne sur http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UGgn4yvEXoQ.
34. Luc Mathieu, “Syria: We should not have believed in this revolution”, Libération, 13 December,
2013. 
35. Probably between 6,000 and 10,000.
36. “Country of Sham”, that is to say, a geographical area comprising Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and
Palestine.
37. François d'Alançon , “À Jaramana, en Syrie, l’esprit civique résiste à la guerre” (In Jaramana,
Syria, civic spirit resists war), La Croix, 13 June 2013. 
38. Popular  committees  are  militias  of  the  regime,  recruited  from  the  most  disadvantaged
sections of Syria. 
39. Ignace Leverrier ,  “Syria. Who wants to ‘terrorize’ the inhabitants of Jaramana? (1/2) ”, Le
Monde.fr, Blog, 10 December 2012.
40. Georges Malbrunot, “Syrie: les islamistes reprennent Maaloula” (Syria, the Islamists recapture
Maaloula), Le Figaro, 3 December 2013. 
41. When this article was written, that is in January 2014.
42. Between 1976 and 2000, Israel relied on the SLA (South Lebanon Army), composed mainly of
Christians and Shiite militia.
43. In  general,  these  difficulties  are  due to  the lack of  funding,  and the total  lack of  heavy
weapons. 
44. Mona Mahmood,  Ian Black,  “Free Syrian Army rebels  defect  to  Islamist  group Jabhat  al-
Nusra”, The Guardian, 8 May 2013.
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ABSTRACTS
Since the end of 2012, the Syrian revolution faces an influx of Shiite fighters sent from Iraq, Iran
and  Lebanon  to  fight  alongside  the  military  regime  of  Bashar  al-Assad.  Among  the  Syrian
opposition, the involvement of foreign mercenaries in the conflict led to the construction of a
sectarian rhetoric, denouncing the “Shiite threat” now weighing on the country. 
By  analysing  popular  and  political  discourses,  this  paper  aims  to  examine  some  collective
representations of these Hizballah or Pasdaran soldiers but also to understand the awakening of
sectarian dynamics and Sunni-Shia tensions in contemporary Syria.
Depuis  la  fin  de  l’année  2012,  la  révolution  syrienne  est  confrontée  à  l’arrivée  massive  de
combattants chiites, projetés d’Irak, d’Iran ou du Liban afin de soutenir militairement le régime
de Bachar al-Assad. Au sein de l’opposition, cet afflux de mercenaires étrangers s’est traduit par
la  construction  populaire  d’une  rhétorique  confessionnelle,  dénonçant  la  « menace »  ou  le
« danger » chiite pesant désormais sur le pays. 
En s’appuyant sur les méthodes d’analyse discursive, l’objectif de cet article est d’examiner les
représentations collectives de ces soldats issus des rangs du Hezbollah ou des Pasdarans iraniens,
mais  également  de  comprendre  le  réveil  des  dynamiques  identitaires  et  confessionnelles
désormais à l’œuvre en Syrie.
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